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Abstract. Programmable components (like personal computers or smart de-
vices) can offer considerable benefits in terms of usability and functionality in a 
safety-related system. However there is a problem in justifying the use of pro-
grammable components if the components have not been safety justified to an 
appropriate integrity (e.g. to SIL 1 of IEC 61508). This paper outlines an ap-
proach (called LowSIL) developed in the UK CINIF nuclear industry research 
programme to justify the use of non safety-assured programmable components 
in modest integrity systems. This is a seven step approach that can be applied to 
new systems from an early design stage, or retrospectively to existing systems. 
The stages comprise: system characterisation, component suitability assess-
ment, failure analysis, failure mitigation, identification of additional defences, 
identification of safety evidence requirements, and collation and evaluation of 
evidence. In the case of personal computers, there is supporting guidance on us-
age constraints, claim limits on reliability, and advice on “locking down” the 
component to maximise reliability. The approach is demonstrated for an exam-
ple system. The approach has been applied successfully to a range of safety-
related systems used in the nuclear industry. 
Keywords: Programmable components, safety integrity, safety assurance. 
1   Introduction 
Programmable components like personal computers (PCs) or smart devices can offer 
considerable benefits in terms of usability and functionality in a safety-related system. 
However there is a problem in justifying the use of programmable components if they 
have not been safety justified to an appropriate integrity (e.g. to SIL 1 of IEC 61508 [3]).  
To address this issue, the UK Control and Instrumentation Nuclear Industries Fo-
rum (CINIF) sponsored a research project (called LowSIL) to assure the safety of 
modest integrity systems that used “non safety-assured programmable components” 
(NSPC). The development of the guidance took place in a series of projects: 
• A review of approaches actually used when PCs were used in safety-related  
systems. 
• Production of guidance for using PCs in safety-related systems. 
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• Generalisation of the approach to other types of NSPC. 
• Updating the guidance in response to user feedback after the guidance had been 
applied to actual systems. 
In parallel to development of the guidance, we also undertook research, primarily on 
Microsoft Windows-based PCs, to establish: 
• Options for “locking down” Windows to make it more reliable and secure. 
• Experimental validation by applying the guidance on a test PC 
• Monitoring over extended periods to establish realistic reliability figures for 
typical applications running under Windows in a locked-down state. 
The LowSIL guidance has been applied within the nuclear industry and has been 
updated to reflect user feedback In the sections below we present the most recent 
version of the guidance that has been produced. This guidance is intended for use 
when: 
• Failure of the system can affect nuclear safety, environmental protection or in-
dustrial safety, the integrity of plant actuations, safety-related information pre-
sented to operators, or the safety integrity of components or calibration data that 
will be used in the plant at some time in the future. 
• The required integrity of the system safety function is at or below SIL 1. Typi-
cally no more than 10-1 failures per demand or 10-4 dangerous failures per hour 
• The system contains one or more NSPC. An NSPC is a programmable device 
such as a PC, a programmable logic controller, or a configurable device such as 
a smart sensor, and does not have sufficient assurance of its safety integrity. 
The guidance can be applied equally to the assessment of new and pre-existing  
systems. Examples of systems where the guidance has been applied are PC-based 
monitoring and logging control systems, maintenance support and control of  
equipment tests. 
2   Safety Assurance Context 
In order to assure the safety of the modest integrity system we first need to identify 
the context in which the system operates as illustrated in Fig.1 below. 










Fig. 1. Safety Assurance Context 
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In this context we have: 
• The modest integrity system, containing one or more NSPC (possibly of differ-
ent types). Other parts of the modest integrity system can be affected by NSPC 
failures, but could also contain defences to detect and mitigate failures. 
• External systems beyond the modest integrity system boundary (like other C&I 
equipment, system operators, etc). Failures that propagate beyond the system 
boundary could affect these external systems. But again there could be defences 
in the wider system that could mitigate the failures. 
3   Structure of the Guidance 
The guidance contains the following elements: 
• Generic guidance that can be applied to any system containing NSPCs. 
• Annexes containing guidance about specific NSPCs. 
This structure was chosen because it could be readily extended to include new types 
of NSPC. Currently the focus has been on Windows-based PCs, but the structure is 
designed to be readily extended to other NSPC, like smart devices or PLCs. 
The specific guidance contains: 
• Limitations on use, e.g. Windows PCs are precluded from use for real-time  
control. 
• Guide performance figures, such as reliability, performance, fail-safety and  
diagnostic coverage. 
• Lock-down guidance to enhance reliability and security. Better guide figures for 
reliability can be used if the component is locked-down. 
4   Overview of the Assessment Process 
For a new modest integrity system, or replacement system, this assessment process 
should start as early in the lifecycle as possible, while it is still feasible to determine 
and influence the modest integrity system design and implementation.  
The steps in the LowSIL process and the resultant documentation outputs  are 
shown in Fig. 2. The decision points are shown as diamonds and represent points 
where the modest integrity system could be rejected as unsuitable. 
It can be seen that the process consists of seven discrete steps, which are summa-
rised below: 
Step 1  Characterise the plant context, modest integrity system, embedded NSPC(s) 
and their types (PC, PLC, etc). Include a clear statement of whether the mod-
est integrity system is a new system, a replacement system or a pre-existing 
system. 
Step 2  Characterise the requirements placed on each NSPC within the system  
and assess if the component can feasibly meet them. This characterisation 
considers: 
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Fig. 2. LowSIL Safety Assessment Process 
• The type of function (e.g., advisory, monitoring, control) per-
formed by each NSPC within the system. 
• The performance targets for the function, especially reliability, 
time-response, etc. 
In a prospective assessment (of a new/replacement system), compare 
the performance targets with reasonable limits provided in the relevant 
NSPC Annex. If the targets exceed these limits, appropriate changes to 
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the design are required (e.g. “hardening” a PC operating system by a 
lock-down of its features). These need to be included in the requirements 
specification for the system. If this is not possible, the system is not con-
sidered acceptable.  
Similarly, in a retrospective assessment (of a pre-existing system), 
continued use of the existing system is not acceptable if the performance 
requirements exceed the guide limits unless there is a statistically valid 
basis from prior use showing that the system can meet its targets.  
Step 3  For each NSPC within the system, identify how it may fail, including 
performance failures such as slow response. Consider how a failure by 
the NSPC could lead to a hazard at the system’s boundary. For example, 
an incorrect command or instruction issued by the system could affect 
the safety performance of other systems or the wider plant. 
Step 4  Assess the safety impact of hazardous NSPC failures, by considering the 
effectiveness of the mitigation available for these failures.  
If there are residual NSPC failures that are not effectively mitigated  
or controlled, the existing mitigation should be strengthened or new  
mitigation added. If this is not possible, the system is not considered  
acceptable.  
Step 5  If shown to be necessary by Step 4, consider additional mitigation op-
tions and select those that are feasible for the system at hand. 
In retrospective assessments this additional mitigation is likely to be 
procedural. Make specific recommendations about the changes and addi-
tions to the existing procedures that will be needed in order to justify the 
continued use of the system. 
In prospective assessments, precedence should be given to technical 
mitigations. Those that are feasible will result in design change proposals 
and new system requirements for inclusion in the requirements specifica-
tion for the system (and possibly in the supply contract). 
If at the end of this step there are still failures of the NSPCs that can-
not be shown to be effectively mitigated or controlled by the additional 
measures, the system cannot be assessed as acceptable. 
Step 6  Collect the requirements that emerged from the previous steps (new 
design requirements, changes to procedures, etc). A successful assess-
ment must show that these new requirements have been met, so in this 
step, determine the additional documentation, verification and validation 
demonstration and other activities (such as independent assessment of the 
software) that will be needed as evidence. Ensure that these evidence re-
quirements are included in the Supplier’s contract, communicated to the 
end-user, etc., as appropriate. 
Step 7  Collect and evaluate the evidence available. Produce the assessment 
report, resulting in a clear recommendation as to whether the system can 
be accepted or not.  
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5   Example Application of the Guidance 
To illustrate the approach, the assessment steps will be applied to a modest integrity 
system that forms part of a Unit Maintenance Facility (UMF) in a power plant. The 
units maintained by the UMF will be used later in plant operation and hence the sys-
tem is safety-related. 
5.1   Step 1:  Characterisation of the Modest Integrity System and Environment 
The modest integrity system incorporates a PC server, a terminal, a printer and local 
area network. It is part of the UMF and acts as the Human-Machine Interface (HMI) 
for the facility’s Safety Logic System (SLS). We will refer to it as the “HMI” system 





Fig. 3. HMI System Architecture and Environment 
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The HMI presents information on the plant status (SLS inputs) and state of the SLS 
outputs. This information is used by the plant operators (technicians) to diagnose 
plant set-up and configuration problems and also by engineers to identify UMF faults.  
The example system and its context are shown in Fig. 3. Note that the links num-
bered 1 to 5 identify the PC interfaces that are a potential source of hazardous fail-
ures.  
Operating Context. The system’s immediate application environment consists of: 
• a high-integrity logic system, known as the SLS, which performs safety inter-
locking for the UMF 
• a communications computer for data acquisition from the SLS 
• a hard-wired alarm facia panel driven directly by the SLS 
• the UMF Technician, who is the first-line user of the HMI system to diagnose 
problems in the UMF plant interfaces 
• the UMF Engineer, who is the person with the role to diagnose faults on the 
plant. 
The system’s broader engineering context is the rest of the UMF system which is 
responsible for assuring safety (via the use of interlocks) of the maintenance equip-
ment. The HMI does not have any active safety role. However, the UMF technician, 
who acts partly on the information presented to him by the HMI system, can change 
the plant set-up and configuration as a result. His actions can therefore affect the state 
and serviceability of the SLS and of the UMF more generally. 
The boundary of the HMI system therefore includes not only the technical ele-
ments above but also the technician who is shown straddling the system’s boundary. 
The Modest Integrity System. The main functions of the HMI are listed below: 
• monitor and log time-stamped data from the SLS 
• present plant status information, including external panel alarms, gathered by 
the SLS to diagnose the plant sensors 
• present faults reported by the SLS itself, e.g. when a card within that system 
malfunctions 
• produce hardcopy reports of the logged data to use in analysis by the mainte-
nance engineer for confirming the correct operation of plant sensors 
The HMI design comprises:  
• A PC-based server, connected to the communications computer via dual-
redundant RS422 links. 
• A display terminal, also a PC, for displaying the data produced by the server to 
the UMF maintenance technician. 
• A printer, for making hardcopies of the logged data. 
• An Ethernet network and a hub. 
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The PC server uses the Microsoft Windows NT operating system. The display PC 
runs Windows CE 3.0. Application software running on the PC server and the client 
implement the monitoring and display functions.  
NSPCs in the System. As can be seen in Fig. 3, the proposed design for the HMI 
system makes use of several NSPCs. These non-assured components are: 
• the server PC (runs the main application software) 
• the display PC (runs the main application software) 
• the printer (contains firmware and is configurable to an extent) 
It is clearly necessary for the assessment to consider the two PC components in detail, 
since they provide the essential functionality of the system.  
5.2.   Step 2:  NSPC Feasibility Assessment 
For the purposes of this illustration we will focus on one of the NSPCs (the PC 
server). This step assesses whether the NSPC is “fit for purpose” by considering 
whether: 
• the functions performed are within the capability of the NSPC 
• the performances demands are within the capability of the NSPC 
This assessment can be supported by NSPC Annex guidance for a PC. 
NSPC Functional Suitability. The overall functions provided by the PC components 
within the system are: 
• data acquisition from the communications computer 
• data display and logging (i.e. data monitoring) 
There is Annex guidance on the types of function that can be performed by PCs. The 
results of the functionality assessment are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Function assessment 
Function type Annex Guidance Assessment 
Monitoring 
interface  
PC can be used to  
monitor non-critical data, 
i.e. system operation can 
continue without the 
displayed data. 
Compliant  
The data collected and logged by the 




or logging  
PC can only be used to 
acquire and display / plot 
non-critical data, i.e. the 
system or environment 
can continue to operate 
without the acquired 
data. 
Compliant  
The UMF can operate without the  
HMI display. 
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NSPC Performance Assessment. The performance demands are assessed using 
guide figures from the Annex as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Performance assessment 
Attribute Target Level Guide Limit Assessment 
Availability > 95% N/A (depends on 
MTBF) 
Feasible.  
Based on guide figures for  
hardware and software MTBF 
and hardware repair and soft-
ware recovery times. 
Reliability > 100 hours 
MTBF 
1,000 hours for the 
Windows operating 
system 
10,000 hours for 
the hardware 
Feasible.  
The limiting factor in this case is 




90% 90% if PC  
supervised  
(50% if PC  
unsupervised) 
Feasible.  
Provided checks can be  
implemented that are 90%  
effective at alerting the operator 




< 5 seconds 
data request 
service time 
< 10 seconds 
data poll rate 
1 second best case 
10 seconds worst 
case 
Feasible.  
Assuming lock-down of the PC 
server operating system. 
Security Medium Medium Feasible. 
Usability Medium High Feasible. 
NSPC Assessment Conclusions. The overall conclusion is that a PC can be used as a 
server provided that: 
• The operating system is locked-down 
• The reliability of the application software meets the target. 
5.3   Step 3:  Failure Identification and Analysis 
A failure analysis can be used to identify hazardous failures of the NSPCs. This could 
be done using a hazard analysis [1, 5] or failure modes and effects analysis [2]. The 
analysis must consider potential failures on all the relevant interfaces with the NSPCs 
(see the links numbered 1 to 5 in Fig. 3). The results of the Hazard analysis of the 
HMI system are shown in Table 3.  
We could also consider any known vulnerabilities of the NSPC at this stage. These 
would be listed in the relevant NSPC Annex. However the “lock-down” guidance can  
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Table 3. Hazard Analysis Summary 
Ref. NSPC Hazardous failure 
HF1 Display PC, 
Server PC  
Incorrect logic state data is displayed to the technician. 
• Wrong status data  
• Missing status data  
HF2 Display PC, 
Server PC 
Out-of-date logic state data is displayed to the technician. 
HF3 Server PC Misleading plant history is logged or reported. 
The history recorded in the logs, or recovered from them, 
may be misleading in the following ways: 
1. Incomplete history because of missing data. 
2. Incorrect history because of wrong data. 
3. Incorrect history because of stale data. 
be viewed as an alternative because a standard set of countermeasures are identified to 
address vulnerabilities and so enhance the integrity and security of the component. 
5.4   Step 4:  Safety Impact Assessment 
In this step we consider whether the existing mitigations to the hazardous NSPC fail-
ures are adequate. The current mitigations are listed in Table 4. 
Table 4. Existing Mitigations 
Ref Description of mitigation 
M1 (External to the HMI system) The SLS safety hardware has fail/OK status 
indicators on each card (reducing the risk of the maintenance technician  
changing the wrong card).  
M2 (External to the HMI system) The equipment is tested after repair – if the 
wrong board is replaced the HMI would still give the same (misleading) state 
after repair. 
M3 (External to the HMI system) There is a separate alarm panel (driven by the 
safety SLS equipment) so the control engineer is not relying on the HMI being 
the primary information source. 
M4 (Internal) Display PC detects failure of server to respond within a set timeout 
period and the display is “greyed-out” to indicate loss of communications with 
server. 
 
These defences are assessed for adequacy against the identified hazardous failures 
shown in Table 5. 
As the defences are only considered to be partially effective, we need to consider 
additional mitigation options, specifically enhancements to: 
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• Assist the detection of data corruption or incorrect processing by the software in 
the display PC or server PC, or require specific activities to be carried out by the 
Supplier to demonstrate that the software has the requisite integrity. 
• Improve the detection of software hangs. 
The options for additional mitigations are addressed in Step 5. 
Table 5. Adequacy of Existing Mitigations 






M1: SLS show plant 
status 








M4: Timeout on loss 
of communications 
Partially.  
Not effective if the display 
PC software itself hangs. 
HF3 Server PC Misleading 
plant history 
M3: Alarm data dis-
play on separate SLS 
panel 
Partially. 
Only provides a snapshot of 
the current status of the plant. 
The diagnosis requires an 
accurate history. 
5.5   Step 5:  Identify Additional Mitigations 
The guidance has a checklist of possible mitigations as shown in Table 6. Their appli-
cability has to be interpreted in the context of the particular system design. 
Table 6. Mitigation Options 
Technical  Procedural 
Partitioning  Periodic proof tests 
End-to-end integrity checks  Regression tests 
External safety checks/interlocks  Fault reporting procedures 
Watchdogs  Change control procedures 
Clear user interface  Security and access control procedures 
Status indication 
Redundancy  
 Procedures for operating under failure 
conditions 
Diversity  Staff competence and training 
For retrospective system assessment, any additional barriers are likely to be proce-
dural. For new systems, there is more scope for incorporating additional technical 
barriers at an early stage in the design. For brevity we will focus on the applicability 
of the potential technical barriers to the HMI system. The results are summarised in 
Table 7. 
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Dummy input signals can be added for checking the  
correctness of the entire data processing done by the HMI 
system. 
Each of these dummy signals displays a set known pattern that 




The PCs do not perform a control function. 
Watchdogs Uncertain. 
More applicable to control computers. 
Clear user interface Already covered. 
HMI display conforms to human factors guidelines. 
Status indication Feasible. 
A heartbeat indicator should be displayed on the display PC to 
show that the screen is being updated and that the data  




Dual communications links are already provided between the 
HMI and the communications computer. 
Diversity Not practicable for PC based systems. 
Based on this assessment, the design is modified to include two additional mitiga-
tions (see Table 8): 
Table 8. Design Enhancements 
Ref. Recommended additional mitigation Mitigates 
M5 End-to-end checks using additional dummy UMF 
plant input signals. 
Reveals failures in data acquisition, processing and 
display / logging functions of the server PC and  
display PC. 
HF1 (wrong data) 
HF3 (wrong logs) 
M6 Status indication. 
Addition of a heartbeat or liveness indicator, which 
would enable the operator to detect whether the  
display screen is being updated.  
HF2 (stale data) 
5.6   Step 6:  Collect and Communicate Evidence Requirements 
In step 6 the evidence requirements from the previous steps are collated and assigned 
for implementation (typically to the system supplier or the plant operator). In Step 2, a 
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Table 9. Additional Requirements 
Source Requirement Performed by 
Step 2 Lock down the operating system in the server PC Supplier 
Step 2 Demonstrate reliability of the application software Supplier 
Step 2 Demonstrate application conforms to standards Supplier 
Step 5 M5: End-to-end integrity check. Implement 
dummy plant input scan software change  
Supplier 
Step 5 M5: Install dummy plant signals in UMF  Plant operator 
Step 5 M5: Test of end-to-end check Operator + supplier 
Step 5 M6: Add status indication “heartbeat” software Supplier 
Step 5 M6: Evidence of correct operation Operator + supplier 
 
need was identified to demonstrate adequate reliability of the application software.  
This could be covered by compliance to appropriate standards (e.g., [3, 4]) and com-
prehensive functional testing. Step 5 identified additional mitigations that need to be 
implemented. We require evidence that these mitigations have been correctly imple-
mented. The additional requirements are shown in Table 9. 
5.7   Step 7:  Evaluate the Evidence and Produce a Report 
Once the changes have been implemented, the evidence is evaluated to assess 
whether it satisfactorily meets the evidence requirements. Based on the evidence 
produced and the analyses performed in the previous steps, an assessment report is 
produced, containing a clear recommendation as to whether the system can be ac-
cepted or not.  
6   Concluding Remarks 
The LowSIL approach has been developed and updated over a number of years and 
has been applied to a range of control and instrumentation systems used in nuclear 
power plants as a means of demonstrating adequate safety assurance when non safety-
assured programmable components are used. Future developments are under consid-
eration, primarily in the development of new Annexes for different operating systems, 
middleware and devices. 
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